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Case Comment
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRIAL-DECORUM IN THE CoURTROOM-The
United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant can lose his
right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge
that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly,
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom. The Court has added that there are at
least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle
an obstreperous defendant: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him
present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom
until he promises to conduct himself properly.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
Allen's conviction for armed robbery was upheld by the Illinois Su-
preme Court.' Later Allen petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court, alleging that he had been wrongfully deprived of his
constitutional right to remain present throughout his trial. During the
course of that trial, Allen repeatedly interrupted the proceedings with
loud talking, argued with the judge in abusive language, and at one
point threatened the judge's life. When the judge warned Allen that
he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted in his dis-
ruptive behavior, he replied that he would continue to talk so that
there would be no trial. 2 Allen was removed from the courtroom twice;
he was permitted to return upon his promise to conduct himself prop-
erly. In all, he was absent during part of the selection of the jury and
during the presentation of the prosecution's case, except for several
occasions of identification.
It was Allen's contention that the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment, which the Court held obligatory upon the states in
Pointer v. Texas,3 grants an accused the right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial. The District Court 4 found no
constitutional violation in the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court
1. People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E2d 1 (1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
2. United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 1969).
3. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
4. United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 1969).
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and declined to issue the writ. The court of appeals reversed, ruling
that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings even if it means that the trial judge must
resort to shackling and gagging to restrain the defendant.
The question at issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether an accused can claim the benefit of his constitutional right
to remain in the courtroom while at the same time he engages in
speech and conduct which is so noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that
it is exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible to carry on the trial.
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Black, with concurring
opinions by Justices Brennan and Douglas, the Court held that a dis-
ruptive defendant can lose his right to be present at the trial. He may
reclaim the right lost as soon as he is willing to conduct himself "con-
sistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts
and judicial proceedings." 8 The Court specifically mentioned (1) bind-
ing and gagging and (2) citing for contempt as additional constitution-
ally permissible methods that trial judges might use in coping with
contumacious defendants. However, it commented that shackling and
gagging might be considered almost as a last resort, since "it is some-
thing of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial pro-
ceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold." 7 The Court added that
trial judges must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circum-
stances of each case, since no one method would be best in all situa-
tions.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the rela-
tionship of properly conducted trials to the preservation of personal
liberty. He recommended that if a defendant is excluded from his
trial, the court should make reasonable efforts to enable him to com-
municate with his attorney and keep him informed of the progress of
the trial.
Justice Douglas said, "I agree with the Court that a criminal trial,
in the constitutional sense, cannot take place where the courtroom is
a bedlam and either the accused or the judge is hurling epithets at
the other."8 However, he questioned the use of the Allen case to estab-
lish guidelines for judicial control. He felt there was some indication
that Allen was mentally ill, and he expressed the view that a con-
5. Id.
6. Illinois v. Allen, 397 US. 337, 343 (1970).
7. Id. at 344.
8. Id. at 351.
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tumacious defendant such as Allen presents a much different case from
"political trials" or "trials used by minorities to destroy the existing
constitutional system."
Thus, the Court's opinion reflects the fact that an integral part of its
consideration of the right of the accused to be present at his trial was
consideration of the problem of dealing with disruptive trials. It is
submitted that the significance of Allen lies not just in its holding,
but extends also to its timeliness and the fact that the decision indi-
cates that the courts and the judicial process are capable of dealing
with attacks on them in the form of disruptive behavior during trials.
In order to develop the significance of the case, this comment will
consider first the sixth amendment right to be present, then the prob-
lem of dealing with disruptive trials, and finally the contribution of
the A llen decision.
The question before the Court in Allen was concerned with the
absoluteness of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. 9 Allen
argued that the right of confrontation is mandatory; it cannot be in-
voluntarily waived. The state of Illinois contended that an accused,
by disruptive behavior, relinquishes his right of confrontation.
The sixth amendmentio to the United States Constitution provides
that an accused shall have the right to confront witnesses against him.
According to the Court in Hopt v. Utah,"i the right of confrontation
includes the right of one prosecuted for a felony to be personally
present at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights may be
affected by the proceedings against him. The Court held that Hopt,
on trial for murder, had been denied constitutional due process because
the challenge to the jurors took place out of his presence.12 Failure of
9. The aspect of the right of confrontation with which Allen was concerned is the
right of an accused to be present at his trial. Therefore, other aspects of the right of
confrontation; i.e., the right of cross examination and the right to confront witnesses,
will not be explored here. The right of an accused to be present at his trial is said to have
its origin in the early common law when trial was by "ordeal." Goldin, Presence of the
Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 18 (1916).
The right of cross examination and the right to confront witnesses are thought to have
originated either from the evils of the Star Chamber or from the hearsay rule. The Right
of Confrontation in Pennsylvania, 20 U. PIr. L. REv. 171, 171 (1958); Brief for Appellee at
6, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Exceptions to the right to confront witnesses are
established; these include dying declarations and documentary evidence among others. Id.
10. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .
U.S. CONsT., amend. VI.
11. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
12. The Court construed the Criminal Code of Utah which provided that a defendant
charged with a felony must be "personally present at the trial" according to the
United States Constitution.
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Hopt's counsel to take exception to the method of jury selection did
not constitute waiver. The Court said:
That which the law makes essential in proceedings involving the
deprivation of life or liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected
by the consent of the accused, much less by his mere failure, when
on trial and in custody, to object to unauthorized methods.13
The Court reasoned that the accused's right to be present at his trial
involves a public interest 14 rather than an individual interest; hence,
it is a right which an individual cannot waive. 15 In Lewis v. United
States'6 and Schwab v. Berggren 7 the Court cited and approved the
Hopt position that in a felony case it is not in the power of an accused,
either by himself or his counsel, to waive the right to be personally
present during every stage of his trial.
The tradition of Hopt and Lewis regarding the inability of an ac-
cused to waive his right to be present at his trial' 8 arose out of fact
situations that are distinguishable from Allen. In none of these cases
did the defendant act in any way that would obstruct the progress of
the trial. Therefore, the Court could concern itself with the rights
of the accused when the accused is cooperating in the judicial process.
The Court in Allen does not make this distinction in negating the
applicability of Hopt and Lewis to Allen. Instead, it refers to the
"broad dicta" in those cases which "has been expressly rejected" by
later decisions.
Hopt and Lewis were distinguished and limited in Frank v. Man-
gum' 9 where the Court recognized voluntary waiver of the accused's
right to be present. In that case, the defendant was not in the court-
room when the verdict was rendered. His presence was waived by his
counsel because of fear of violence on the part of spectators. The Court
held that, in the situation which existed, the defendant could waive
his right to be present.
In Diaz v. United States20 the defendant in a homicide case volun-
tarily absented himself from trial on two occasions during the examina-
13. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884).
14. The public interest was described as the interest of the public in the life and
liberty of its members. Id.
15. The contra argument is that, if one may waive his right to trial by jury (by plead-
ing guilty, for instance), can he not also waive his right to be present at the trial.
16. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
17. 143 U.S. 442 (1892).
18. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
19. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
20. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
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tion and cross examination of government witnesses. The Court held
that he could waive his sixth amendment right to be present during
every stage of the trial 21 and explicitly distinguished the case from Hopt
and Lewis. While Diaz stands for voluntary waiver, it has added
significance to the Allen decision since the basis for that waiver was
the maxim that the law does not permit a person to profit from his
own wrong.
For this, Diaz relied upon Falk v. United States,22 a District of
Columbia Appellate Court decision. In Falk the accused, at large on
bail, was present when the trial began but fled the jurisdiction before
it was completed. The court held that Falk had waived his right of
confrontation and that continuation of the trial in his absence did not
violate his rights. Thus, Falk involved a waiver implied by the court
from Falk's absence.23 The court said that it would not be consonant
with common sense to permit an accused person to break up a trial,
since the result would be to prevent trial until such time as the accused
would permit it. In addition, said the court, neither the right of per-
sonal liberty nor any constitutional principle leads to any conclusion
that would be so disastrous to the administration of justice as well as
to the interests of civil liberty. The court said further:
The question is one of broad public policy, whether an accused
person, placed upon trial for crime, and protected by all the safe-
guards with which the humanity of our present criminal law
sedulously surrounds him, can with impunity defy the processes
of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries, and
turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society,
for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of
personal liberty. Neither in criminal nor in civil cases will the
law allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong.
24
The position of the court in Falk was based on Reynolds v. United
States25 where the Court said: "The Constitution does not guarantee
a person against the consequences of his own wrongful acts." 26
21. Although a Philippine case, Diaz was decided on the basis of the United States
Constitution and the sixth amendment. Id. at 454.
22. 15 App. D.C. 446 (1899).
23. The Falk decision expressly stated that the holding of Lewis was not antagonistic
to the Falk position, and noted that the cases of Lewis and Hopt were not of the same
tenor as Falk.
24. 15 App. D.C. at 460.
25. 98 U.S. 244 (1879). This case dealt with that aspect of the right of confrontation
that has to do with the right to confront witnesses. The Court there held that one ac-
cused of bigamy had waived his constitutional right of confrontation when he volun-
tarily caused witnesses against him to be absent.
26. Id. at 274. The Court quoted from Lord Morley's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 770 (1666),
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The court in Falk, in deciding that an implied waiver of the right
to be present at trial was legally and constitutionally possible, was
giving recognition to the public's interest that justice not be obstructed.
Thus, that court came to terms with an apparent conflict between two
interests: interest of the public in the right of Falk to due process
and interest in the administration of public justice. In resolving the
question, the court recognized that constitutional protections would
become no protection at all if the courts, responsible under the Con-
stitution for upholding those protections, were prevented from func-
tioning.
The situation in Falk is analogous to that in Allen since in both
cases the defendant's actions were such as to place an obstruction in
the progress of his trial. The difference is that Falk's obstruction con-
sisted of fleeing the jurisdiction, making his actions patently inconsistent
with any claim to the right to be present. Allen, despite his obstruction-
ist conduct, demanded to be present throughout his trial. There is an
inconsistency in demanding to be present at trial while at the same
time engaging in conduct aimed at preventing the trial to progress.
However, it presents a more subtle basis for waiver of the right to be
present; one could argue (as did Allen's counsel) that by shackling and
gagging, for instance, the accused's presence could be assured.
More inroads on the absoluteness of the right of an accused to be
present at trial were made by Snyder v. Massachusetts27 where waiver
was not involved. Snyder, on trial for murder and attempted robbery,
demanded to be present at a view of the site. His motion was denied.
However, his counsel was present at the viewing. The Court held that
he had not been denied his constitutional right to be present at his
trial.28 Noting that Hopt has already been limited, the Court held that
in a prosecution for a felony the defendant has the privilege to be
present whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial,
to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. Further-
more, the Court said, due process requires the presence of the accused
during a prosecution for a felony "to the extent that a fair and just
in which it was stated: "The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. . . .We are content with this long estab-
lished usage, which, so far as we have been able to discover, has not really been departed
from. It is an outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty, and
if properly administered, can harm no one."
27. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
28. The Court's decision was made on the assumption, although it did not so decide,
that the sixth amendment was applicable to the states under the fourteenth.
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hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. '29
The Court described the requirement of due process as fairness, a
relative rather than an absolute concept. This does not mean that the
accused must be present "every second or minute or even hour of the
trial."30
What is of most importance to Allen in the Snyder decision is this
statement of Justice Cardozo, who spoke for the Court: "No doubt the
privilege may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct."3 1
Some may argue that it is dictum, since Snyder involved neither con-
sent nor misconduct. Others will claim that it is an essential statement
in an opinion which defines limits on the right of an accused to be
present at his trial. Dictum or not, that statement, based on Diaz, is
the kingpin of the A len decision. Considered as based on the maxim
that the law does not permit one to profit from his own wrong, neither
its reasonableness not its logic can be denied.
While Diaz (and Falk, before it) referred to "waiver" of the right
to be present, Cardozo's statement and the Allen decision refer to
"loss" of the right, a more serious consequence than "waiver" since the
latter implies consent.3 2 However, the Court in Allen talks of "losing"
the right only under certain conditions: (1) that warning be given
by the judge that the accused can be removed for contumacious behav-
ior; (2) that the defendant insists on continuing his disruptive behavior;
(3) that the defendant's behavior is so disorderly, disruptive, and dis-
respectful that the trial cannot be carried on with him in the court-
room. Thus, while the Court speaks of "loss" of a right, it is a
"knowing" loss in the sense that it is occasioned by the defendant's
deliberate actions after he has received a warning by the court. Nor
does the Court permit loss of the right for minimal behavioral dis-
29. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934).
30. Id. at 116. Until Snyder, limitations on the right to be present had been extended
only to situations where waiver could be construed. Following Snyder, decisions declared
absences of a defendant during a trial, where no waiver was involved, to be constitu-
tionally permissible at these times: during the hearing on a motion, while the clerk is
performing ministerial acts, during conferences between the court and attorneys, during
discussion of questions of law, during arguments by counsel to the jury. Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943); 85 A.L.R.2d 1112; 41 MIcH. L R y. 966, 967 (1943).
31. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
32. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 778 (4th ed. 1951). "Forfeit" is defined as "to lose, or
lose the right to, by some error, fault, offense, or crime .. " At 1094 "lose" is defined
as ". . . to suffer the loss of, to part with, especially in an accidental or unforeseen
manner.. ." At 1751 "waive" is defined as "to abandon, throw away, renounce, repudiate,
or surrender a claim, a privilege, a right, or the opportunity to take advantage of some
defect, irregularity, or wrong." In the oral argument before the Court, there was dis-
cussion of whether "waive" or "forfeit" was the appropriate term. 6 Crim. Law Rep.
4170, 4171 (1970).
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turbances; the disorder must be so great as to make progress of the
trial impossible. This establishes a standard, albeit the trial judge's
discretion is involved in determining when the disorder reaches the
point of becoming obstructive. A standard should have the effect of
discouraging arbitrary removal of the defendant. In cases where it does
not, it establishes a basis for appeal.
The foregoing cases show the evolvement of the nonabsolute quality
of the constitutional right of an accused to be present at his trial. They
also establish that the constitutionality of removal of a disorderly de-
fendant from the courtroom can be squared with precedent. Despite
the fact that the Allen decision is not based on any new legal theory
nor on the overruling of any previous holding, disruptive defendants
were removed from the courtroom in only a few trials prior to
Allen.a3 Such removals have occurred in jurisdictions with constitu-
tional provisions for confrontation similar to that in the Federal
Constitution.8 4
In United States v. Davis,8 5 the defendant, accused of perjury, per-
sisted in interrupting the district attorney in a loud voice despite the
court's repeated warnings to refrain. He was removed to an adjoining
room with liberty of access by his counsel, and the district attorney's
opening continued in his absence. That court said:
The right of a prisoner to be present at his trial does not include
the right to prevent a trial by unseemly disturbance. He was ab-
sent during a part [of the trial] . . . only because of his own dis-
orderly conduct. It does not lie in his mouth to complain of the
order which was made necessary by his own misconduct, and which
he could at any time have terminated by signifying his own willing-
ness to avoid creating a disturbance.8 6
33. See 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 271 (1965).
34. Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant from his own Trial, A Com-
parative View, 36 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 171, 174 (1964). State constitutional provisions are
important in cases prior to 1965, since the provisions of the sixth amendment of the
Federal Constitution were not declared applicable to the states until Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330 (1969) where the court
resorted to shackling and gagging because the right to be present was thought to be
absolute.
35. 25 Fed. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C., S.D.N.Y. 1869). See 36 L. Ed. 1011, 1012, for
an annotation, citing Davis as authority for the statement: "Where by reason of his loud
language, frequent interruptions, and violent conduct, it becomes impossible to proceed
with the trial, the court may order his removal to an adjoining room, with liberty of
access for his counsel, and have him brought back again when quieted, without infringe-
ment of his constitutional right." In 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 271 (1965) Davis
is cited with this statement: "Where the defendant, despite admonitions, persists in dis-
turbing the proceedings, it has been held that he cannot complain of any exclusion
from the courtroom made necessary by his own misconduct."
36. 25 Fed. Cas. 773, supra note 35 at 774.
100
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In People v. DeSimone37 one of four defendants on trial for murder
was removed from the courtroom after all the evidence was in and
just prior to the closing arguments. His removal was a result of his
profane outbursts at witnesses and the court, and his action in seizing
and tearing to bits one of the exhibits. The record does not indicate
if warnings were given before his removal. He was absent from the
courtroom for only a short time. The question asked on appeal was
whether his involuntary absence was a violation of the state constitu-
tion which provided that the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person. The Illinois court said:
It is obvious from the record that defendant's removal was neces-
sary to prevent such misconduct as would obstruct the work of the
court; such misconduct was, in turn, effective as a waiver of the
defendant's right to be present. The right to appear is not given
to a defendant to prevent his trial either by voluntary absence, or
by wrongfully obstructing its progress. 8
In Pearson v. United States0 the accused, charged with transporting
stolen cars across state lines, was removed from the courtroom after
his loud protests that he did not want to remain at the trial. The judge
had warned that he would be held in contempt if he did not become
quiet. Relying on Snyder, the court held that there was no violation
of either his constitutional rights or Rule 43, Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure40 when the trial continued in his absence, since he had
voluntarily waived his right to remain.
Similarity to Allen exists in these cases: removal only after the judge's
warning (Davis and Pearson); a recognition of the fact that behavior
that prevents the trial's progress is inconsistent with a claim to the
right to be present. (Davis, Pearson, DeSimone). In Davis the court in-
dicated that the removed defendant had ample opportunity to consult
with his counsel. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Allen recom-
mends that a removed defendant should have such an opportunity and
that he should receive reports of the trial's progress. Allen's counsel
37. 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
38. 9 Ill. 2d at 533, 138 N.E.2d at 562.
39. 117 U.S. App. D.C. 52, 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir., 1963).
40. 18 U.S.C., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, (1964), Rule 43, Presence of the
Defendant: "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the
trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentencing, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions
for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial
has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and
including the return of the verdict ....
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suggested 41 that an unruly defendant might be removed to an area
where he could view the trial over closed circuit TV and be in touch
with his counsel by telephone. The Court did not expressly reject this
recommendation and left the door open for development of other ideas
when it stated there are "at least" three constitutionally permissible
ways for handling an obstreperous defendant. However, the Court said
nothing in its opinion about consultation privileges or information
about the trial's progress. This would seem to be consistent with its
declaration that the right to be present can be lost. To provide for
consultation privileges would be (1) to declare that one loses a right
because of his wrongful conduct and then (2) to follow that with an
immediate provision for the advantages associated with the right that
was lost! Of course, there is nothing to prevent counsel from consulting
with the defendant during recess-action one might consider as gen-
erally to be expected. It may be that this was part of the Court's think-
ing. It may also be that the Court felt it was unnecessary to make a
statement regarding consultation since it very clearly stated the length
of time a defendant may be absent from his trial when he loses the
right to be present. He may reclaim his right as soon as he is willing to
conduct himself properly. Of course, this means he will reclaim con-
sultation privileges at the same time.
Thus far the concern in this comment has been with examining the
basis for the Court's decision that the constitutional right to be present
at trial may be lost. In the Allen decision, consideration of this right is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of methods of coping with
disruptive trials.42
The problem of disruptive trials which the Court faced in Allen is
an old one and has been defined as follows:
Broadly speaking, this question focuses attention on one of the
most troublesome problems arising in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence-the apparent conflict between the necessity for an orderly
administration of justice and the preservation of those safeguards
of fair play and substantial justice in criminal proceedings which
we ordinarily associate with the liberal, democratic tradition.
To be sure, the very notion of fair play and substantial justice as-
sumes a court, a hearing and an orderly administration. The idea
cannot be permitted to destroy itself. Accordingly, when conduct
41. Brief for Appellee at 9, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
42. See 6 Crim. Law Rep. 4170, 4171 (1970) for report of oral argument before the
Court regarding means of coping with disruptive defendants.
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occurs in the courtroom of such a nature as to obstruct orderly
judicial procedure, it must be dealt with as the necessities require.
There will be occasions when procedure to insure fairness can be
preserved only by dealing with those who threaten its destruction
by means short of those usually guaranteed to persons accused of
ordinary crime.43
Disturbances in the courtroom have been recorded from the days of
the early common law. Fox 44 reports that in Plantagenet times courts
faced the problem of persons who caused disturbances. He cites De-
Brewes' case 45 where the judge was insulted in court, and another 46
which involved "making a disturbance and hindering the Justice of
Assize."147
In the United States, the trial of the assassin of President Garfield
was marked by profane and vile abuse of the judge by the defendant,
Guiteau. 48 The trial was so disorderly that the public press asked why
Judge Cox had neither removed nor gagged the defendant and Congress
discussed the possibility of investigating the lack of order in the court.
Hence, courtroom disorder, and an accompanying public outcry, dates
back at least ninety years in the United States.
The Court in Allen took this position with regard to disruption:
It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that
dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court pro-
ceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom
of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot
be tolerated.49
This position is consistent with state court holdings to the effect that
disturbance, disruption, obstruction, and violence are not just abhor-
rent, but are completely contradictory to the whole concept of a fair
trial and the fair administration of justice by the courts.50 As one court
said: "The trial contemplated by the constitutional provision is an
43. Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 60 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1951).
44. Fox, The Summary Process To Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q.R. 238, 240 (1920);
Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q.R. 191, 197 (1921).
45. Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, supra note 44, at 242, citing
DeBrewes' Case, 33 Edw. I, Abbrev. Placit. 256-7, rot. 75.
46. Id. at 243, citing Anon. 17 Edw. II, Abbrev. Placit. 342, rot. 16.
47. Id.
48. Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161 (1882).
49. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
50. "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum." In re Cooper, 32 Vt.
253, 257 (1859).
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orderly one."5' The Allen decision5 2 is also consistent with other deci-
sions of the Court, such as Sheppard v. Maxwell,53 where the Court
held that a trial conducted in a courtroom made a hysterical scene by
the actions of spectators and the press constituted reversible error.
Anglo-American courts have resorted to three main methods for deal-
ing with disorderly trials: (1) citing for contempt, (2) shackling and
gagging, (3) removing from the courtroom disruptive defendants.
Contempt of Court. Of the three methods, the oldest and most fre-
quently used is that of citing for contempt. Fox has traced its history
back through Blackstone and Hawkins. 54 In the United States, statutory
law55 as well as case law provides for the power of the courts to hold
for contempt anyone who impedes or obstructs the administration of
justice. In Ex Parte Robinson56 the Court said:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial pro-
ceedings.... and consequently to the due administration of justice.
The moment the courts of the United States were called into ex-
istence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they be-
came possessed of this power. 57
51. State v. Scruggs, 165 La. 842, 870 116 So. 206, 216 (1928).
52. See also Judge Hastings' dissent in United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S.
337 (1970).
53. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
54. Fox, supra note 44 at 240. From the early common law, reports of citations for
contempt occur in 22 Edward III where the court ordered disinheritance and perpetual
imprisonment for an esquire who drew his sword to strike the judge. Fox, supra note
44 at 198. There is a report of a felon who threw a brickbat at Chief Justice Richardson
in 1631. He was hanged for his contempt. Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for
Contempt, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 956, 965 (1931). Livingston (Complete Works of Edward
Livingston on Criminal Jurisprudence, 1873 ed., at 264) indicated that ", . . courts are,
or ought to be, armed with every power necessary to defend themselves. Noise, inter-
ruptions, violence of every kind, must be repressed; obedience to all lawful orders must
be enforced. . . .There is a necessity that courts should have the power of removing
interruptions to their proceedings .. " (Id. at 963, 4).
55, At the federal level, 18 U.S.C. 1501-1510 (Supplement IV 1965-1968). Section
1503 provides that if any person corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavors to influence,
intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States,
in the discharge of his duty or, corruptly or by threats of force, obstructs, impedes, or
endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice, that person shall be
liable to prosecution, fine, or imprisonment. See also 3 Wharton's Criminal Law and
Procedure § 1277, Interference with the Courts (1957) at 623: "The obstruction of the
administration of justice is an indictable offense under the common law and by statute
in many jurisdictions;" at 624: "By obstructing those proceedings, public justice is ob-
structed."
56. 86 U.S. 205 (19 Wall.), (1873).
57. Id. at 207. See also Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) where at 313 the Court
said: "We have seen that it is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England
and of this country, never supposed to be in conflict with the liberty of the citizen,
that for direct contempts committed in the face of the court, . . . the offender may ...
be instantly apprehended . . . ; and that, according to the unbroken chain of authorities,
reaching back to the earliest times, such power, although arbitrary in its nature and
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In Cooke v. United States 8 the Court held that due process is not
denied when a court, in imposing punishment for disturbance, physical
obstruction, or disrespect to the court occurring in open court, without
hearing evidence and according the offender assistance of counsel, acts
with due process of law.
Two widely publicized cases where the contempt power has been
used by the trial judge are United States v. Dennis9 and United States
v. Dellinger.6O In both' cases the trial was marked by interruptions
caused by the angry shouting, name calling, and delaying tactics of
both the defendants and their attorneys. The trial judge in each case
waited until the trial had ended, and then imposed jail sentences of up
to six months for criminal contempt under Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure6' on both the defendants and their at-
torneys. In the Dellinger case, Judge Hoffman imposed sentence for
each separate act of contempt. The contempt sentences imposed by
Judge Medina in the Dennis case were upheld on appeal. 62 The Del-
linger case is currently on appeal.
Contempt, as a method for dealing with disruption in the courtroom,
has disadvantages which may make other methods more effective in
certain circumstances. If the judge waits until the end of the trial to
cite for contempt, he insures continuation of the trial but the disorder
is likely to continue. Then there is the situation, as in A llen, where a
defendant faces the possibility of a long jail term if found guilty on
the original charge. Such a defendant will hardly be dissuaded from his
disorderly behavior by either the threat of or an additional sentence
for contempt. In fact, some defendants may deliberately pursue disor-
der hoping for an immediate sentence for contempt that would delay
liable to abuse, is absolutely essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge
of their functions. Without it, judicial tribunals would be at the mercy of the disorderly
and violent, who respect neither the laws enacted for the vindication of public and
private rights, nor the officers charged with the duty of administering them." In Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) the Court at 285 called the contempt power "an un-
questioned characteristic of English and American courts."
58. 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
59. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950); afl'd. on other grounds Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951)-popularly known as the communist conspiracy trial.
60. United States v. Dellinger. 69 CR-180 (D.C., N.D. I1.1 1969). It is popularly known
as the trial of the Chicago seven.
61. 18 U.S.C., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1964), Rule 42(a)" "A criminal
contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the
conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence
of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge
and entered of record."
62. See United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 851
(1949); United States v. Green, 176 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1949), ceit.-denied 338 US. 851 (1949);
United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950). :
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the trial and open the possibility that a witness may die or move from
the jurisdiction before the trial was resumed.
Gagging and Shackling. Disadvantages are also associated with gag-
ging and shackling. As the Court noted in Allen, it can have a signifi-
cant effect on the jury, it reduces the defendant's ability to communi-
cate with his counsel, and it is an affront to the dignity the judge seeks
to uphold.63 However, binding and gagging has the advantage of
keeping the defendant in the courtroom, and has been used for many
years by both American and English courts.
The right of an accused to be tried free of shackles or bonds, unless
there is danger of his escape, was present in the early common law and
appears in both Blackstone6 4 and Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown.65 United
States lower courts, following the common law, have held that the de-
fendant in a criminal trial has the right to be free and unfettered as
part of his right to a fair and impartial trial.66 State courts have held
it reversible error to permit a defendant to be shackled during trial
when there is not sufficient reason to keep him manacled; i.e., when
shackling was not necessary either to prevent the escape of the accused,
to prevent him from injuring others, or to maintain a quiet and peace-
ful trial.61 Reasons for the right of an accused to defend himself while
unshackled include: 68 (1) the right to defend one's self unhampered
by the mental confusion and embarrassment caused by shackles; 69
(2) deprivation of free and calm use of all his faculties;70 (3) denial to
him of the appearance and dignity of an innocent man;71 (4) the pos-
sibility of creating prejudice in the minds of the jury;72 (5) shackling
is "obnoxious to the spirit of our laws and all ideas of justice." 73
State courts have held that a trial judge does not abuse his discretion
in ordering an unruly defendant bound, gagged, shackled, or strapped
to the chair if doing so is necessary to prevent misconduct of such a
63. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
64. 4 BLACK. COM., c. 25, 317 (1769).
65. 2 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown 219 (1678).
66. Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1960).
67. State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 97 N.W.2d 472 (1959).
68. Toohey, Handcuffing the Defendant during the Trial, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 401 (1964).
69. 31 MINN. L. REv. 374 (1946) citing Lilburne's Case (1649) 4 State Tr. 1270, 1303;
Cranburne's Case (1696) 13, State Tr. 222; 4 BLACK. CoM. (Lewis' ed. 1897), c.25, 322.
70. Toohey, supra note 68. State v. Williams, 18 Wash. 47, 50 P. 580 (1897).
71. 31 MINN. L. Rzv. supra; Toohey, supra; Eddy v. People,- 115 Colo. 488, 492, 174
P.2d 717, 719 (1946).
72. Toohey, supra note 68. Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 327, 188 S.W. 390,
393 (1916).
73. Toohey, supra note 68. Gray v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 305, 322, 268 S.W. 941,
1950 (1924).
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natureas would obstruct the work of the court.74 In People v. Loomis7 5
the trial court's action was held to be proper in ordering the defendant
confined to a wheel chair with a towel placed over his mouth after he
persisted, despite repeated admonitions from the court, in breaking
away from officers, in kicking counsel's table, and in throwing himself
on the floor feigning insanity. The California appellate court in People
v. Merkouris8 held that the trial court had the right to use reasonable
physical restraint of the defendant in order that the trial might be con-
ducted in an orderly and dignified manner. In that case, the defendant,
on trial for murder, interrupted examination of the state's witnesses,
stated that the judge was conducting the trial in a prejudicial manner,
called the judge a "stupid old fool," said the court had a bungling
police department and an unscrupulous prosecutor. In the trial of
Van Bogart, 77 the defendant was gagged after he had interrupted pro-
ceedings and refused to be quiet despite the judge's warnings. The
Arizona court said:
While we concede that the measure employed by the court was
drastic, yet, it is not only the right but the duty of a presiding
judge to maintain order and decorum in the courtroom while the
court is in session. The failure to do so would quickly bring a court
into disrepute to the extent that it could neither demand nor com-
mand the respect of the public. The methods employed by the
court to maintain order and dignity in the courtroom are com-
mensurate with the necessities of each case. . . .A trial was in
progress in which the defendant was charged with a felony ...
The defendant by his own conduct, made it impossible to con-
tinue.78
United States lower courts have also upheld trial judges who have
ordered contumacious defendants shackled. In United States v. Bent-
vena79 the trial court ordered two defendants gagged and shackled after
one had climbed into the jury box and pushed jurors, and another
74. People v. Kerridge, 20 Mich. App. 184, 173 N.W.2d 789 (1969); People v. Kimball,
5 Cal. 2d 608, 55 P.2d 483 (1936); 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 977 (1961).
75. 27 Cal. App. 2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938).
76. 46 Cal. App. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999 (1956). Merkouris was placed in a plastic booth
as a first restraint, but he tried to smash it apart with his chair. The court then sub-
stituted an iron chair that was bolted to the floor and fastened Merkouris in it with leg
clamps. He then pretended to fall asleep. He was later found insane. Newsweek, Mar.
2, 1970, (Magazine) at 26, col. 2.
77. State v. Van Bogart, 85 Ariz. 63, 331 P.2d 597 (1958), cert. denied 359 U.S. 973
(1959).
78. 331 P.2d at 600.




had thrown a chair at an assistant United States attorney. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the trial judge was justified,
indeed was forced, to resort to such stern measures to obtain order in
his courtroom. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in Wilson v. United States80 that the trial court had not erred
when it caused a defendant who had disrobed when his case was called
for trial (and who also caused difficulties with the marshall) to be
wrapped in blankets and brought to the courtroom in handcuffs and
leg irons. In Seale v. Hoffman8l Seale alleged that his constitutional
tights were violated when the trial judge ordered him forcibly gagged
and handcuffed. The court said that a defendant does not have a right.
to brazenly make a shambles of the criminal judicial process and at-
tempt to force a mistrial. Therefore, the court did not find that the
physical restraints placed upon Seale, under the circumstances, in-
fringed upon a constitutionally protected right.
While the cases reported above are not inclusive, the number does
indicate that gagging and shackling has been used much more fre-
quently in American courts as a method for handling disruptive de-
fendants than has removal of the defendant. Until the Allen decision
the fact that shackling is constitutionally permissible had never been
declared by the United States Supreme Court. Although the Allen
decision very expressly declares its constitutionality, the comments of
the Court with regard to the distastefulness of this method may have
a tendency to cause trial judges to resort to removal of the defendant
more frequently than they have in the past.
Removal of the Defendant. Removal of a disruptive defendant, de-
clared constitutionally permissible in Alien, has been practiced in civil
law countries and in England under the common law. Statutory enact-
ments in Spain, Germany, Italy, and France provide that an accused
has the right to be present at his trial. They also provide that an ac-
cused may be expelled from the trial for rmisbehavior.8 2
In England, removal of a disorderly defendant has been articulated
only in case law83 and then only in a few cases. In Regina v. Berry,8 4
a felony case, the defendant was removed after he had leaped over the
80. 344 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for rehearing denied (1965).
81. Seale v. Hoffmani 306 F. Supp. 330 (1969). This involved occurrences during United
States v. Dellinger. 69 CR-180 (D.C., N.D. Ill., 1969).
82. Murray, supra note 34, at 178.
83. Id. at 175. .




heads of counsel, removed his clothing, and proceeded to shout wildly.
despite warnings from the court that such behavior, if continued,
would lead to his removal. Rex v. Browne8 5 involved a trial for "misde-
meanor where the defendant screamed, threw herself down, and after
warning by the court, was removed. Returned to- the courtroom, she
was removed again after additional disruptive behavior.8 6
A consideration of the Court in Allen in holding. that the trial judge
had acted within his discretion in removing Allen from the courtroom
was the choice of alternatives open to the judge. The Court said that,
under the circumstances, removal of the defendant was preferable to
either binding and gagging or citing for contempt. Other alternatives,
such as placing the defendant in a plastic or glass booth s7 were not
specifically mentioned in the Court's opinion. Instead, the Court stayed
with three methods of dealing with unruly defendants that have been
used since the early days of the common law and have been accepted
as representing fairness and justice. Thus, while the Court has not
precluded the use of new techniques and devices, it has mentioned as
constitutionally permissible those methods which have withstood the
test of time. Significantly, such methods existed. The Court did not
prescribe any "best" method, noting that no one method may be effec-
tive in all situations. Instead, the Court left to the discretion of the
trial judge the choice of method best suited to the circumstances. In
so doing, the Court reaffirmed a well settled principle of law that it is
the responsibility of the trial judge to preserve decorum in the court-
room and the integrity of procedure, 8 and at the same time recognized
the need for flexibility in coping with disruption.
In evaluating the Allen decision, consideration must be given to the
issues raised regarding the appropriateness of this case for setting forth
methods of dealing with disorder in the courtroom. As established pre-
viously, a standard of a fair, impartial, orderly trial exists in the com-
mon law, under the Constitution, and in the Court's decisions. That
standard has been set for all trials-regardless -of whether they receive
little or much publicity, whether they be of political significance or not.
There has been no double standard. A person accused of crime is en-
85. 70 J.P. 472 (London Cent. Crim. Ct. 1906), cited in Murray, supra note 34, at 176.
86. Both Berry and Browne were declared mentally fit for trial, but some questions
have been raised as to their sanity. See Murray, supra note 34, at 176.
87. Brief for Appellee at 9, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. :337 (1970).
88. In Re Trials of Pending and Future- Criminal Cases, 306 F. Supp. 333 (1969);
People v..Merkouris, 46 Cal. App. -24: 540, 297 P.2d 999-(1956)....."
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titled to the same justice, regardless of whether his crime is associated
with a political cause. It is the function of the courts to administer
justice, to decide regarding the crime-not the political issue. Thus,
Allen, a little publicized, nonpolitical case, free of public emotional
reaction, was an appropriate vehicle for establishing guidelines for trial
judges to use in disruptive trials. While some of the so-called political
trials (such as Dennis and Dellinger) have been disorderly, a far greater
number of criminal trials of a nonpolitical nature have been disrupted
by contumacious defendants.8 9 Thus, Allen meets a need of trial judges
in many criminal cases, not just the well publicized ones.
Questions have been raised regarding Allen's sanity at the time of
his trial. However, the record shows that Allen was declared to be sane
according to Illinois standards for competency to stand trial,90 and the
Court's decision was made on the basis of that record.91
The Allen decision was announced by the Court at a time92 when
the problem of disruptive trials had become a national issue, largely
as a result of United States v. Dellinger.9" In the public press, questions
were asked regarding the capability of the courts and the judicial pro-
cess for coping with disorderly conduct in the courtroom and whether
the courts as institutions could survive such assault.94 Thus, the time-
89. In the time period between Dennis and Dellinger at least ten disorderly trials have
occurred: State v. Van Bogart, 85 Ariz. 63, 331 P.2d 597 (1958); Wilson v. United States,
344 F. 2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for rehearing denied (1963); People v. Merkouris,
46 Cal. App. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999 (1956); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916
(2d Cir. 1963); People v. Kerridge, 20 Mich. App. 184, 173 N.W.2d 789 (1969); People v.
Henley, 2 Mich. App. 54, 138 N.W.2d 505, rev'd on other grounds, 382 Mich. 143, 169
N.W.2d 299 (1969); People v. Stabler, 21 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1962); People v. Reynolds, 20
Mich. App. 389; People v. Duplissey, 380 Mich. 100, 155 N.W.2d 850 (1968); People v.
LaMarr, 1 Mich. App. 389, 136 N.W.2d 708 (1965).
90. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. at 357 n.5.
91. Id.
92. The Allen decision is dated March 31, 1970. It was argued February 24, 1970.
The jury verdict in Dellinger was returned on February 15, 1970 after a trial which
began in October, 1969.
93. United States v. Dellinger. 69 CR-180 (D.C., N.D. Ill., 1969).
94. See The Judicial Process on Trial, Newsweek, Mar. 2, 1970, (Magazine) at 25.
It is stated: "the trial of the Chicago Seven revealed how vulnerable the American
judicial process really is ..." . .. a good many sober observers wondered whether the
system could survive many more such tests without redrawing its rules in ways that
had seemed unimaginable only a few years ago." Lucas, The Second Confrontation in
Chicago, New York Times (Magazine) March 29, 1970, at 52: "it is easy enough to main-
tain due process and constitutional rights in ordinary times and ordinary cases. It is
precisely in extraordinary circumstances like these that the court system is put to its
ultimate test. Institutions like people must be judged on how they react to pressure ....
Judge Hoffman's judicial apparatus met challenge with its own form of over reaction.
Perhaps our institutions so imposing in placid times are too fragile to withstand the
shock of confrontation." Nizer, What to Do When the Judge is Put Up Against the Wall,
New York Times (Magazine) for April 5, 1970, at 122: "In short, our judicial system
lacks the common sense means to deal with judicial sabotage." At -126: "There is no




liness with which the Allen decision provided answers to questions of
public concern contributes to its significance. In doing so, it has also
shown that the judicial system can act with appropriate speed and that
it is responsive to matters of public concern.
That A lien did answer questions of public concern is best illustrated
by a listing of matters contained in the opinion: Allen has declared
that, in addition to contempt, both removal and shackling and gagging
are constitutionally permissible ways of dealing with contumacious de-
fendants; it has upheld the trial judge's role in keeping decorum in
the courtroom; it has upheld the necessity for dignity in the court;
it has upheld that a fair trial is an orderly trial; it has given the "go
ahead" to courts that may want to try new techniques for dealing with
disorderly defendants. Some questions the decision has not answered
because the facts in Allen did not so permit, principally the problem
of dealing with the attorney who encourages or cooperates with his
client in disrupting the trial.9 5 Nor has it resolved the issue of whether
the act of disrupting a trial should be made a felony; 96 this is a legisla-
tive matter.
The Allen decision is well grounded in precedent and based on prac-
tices long established under both the English common law and Ameri-
can law. To cope with the problem of disruptive trials, the Court did
not have to reach out for something new. The fact that the Court could
-and did-select time tested procedures indicates that disruptive trials
are neither a new phenomenon nor a new threat to the judicial process.
Thus, the case illustrates that the law and the courts, as institutions,
do have methods for dealing with disorderly trials, have had them,
and have used them to meet the situation in the past. It is an entirely
different matter that some observers may not like these methods, or
that the persons empowered to use them may not always make use of
them or may not always act wisely. These factors neither make the
dants and their counsel committed. . . . We have proceeded for centuries on the theory
that all parties and their counsel in a trial will comply with certain rules. These rules
are sensitively construed so that the rights of defendants may be preserved. It was not
anticipated that defendants would seek to escape justice by making it impossible to con-
duct a trial. That and not Judge Hoffman's conduct is the issue." Assault on the Courts,
National Review, February 24, 1970, at 190 contains a statement that recent trials
"make it also obvious that our judicial structure does not have at is disposal means
sufficient to counter their kind of Maoist assault." Judge Murtaugh's Formula, The Nation
for March 9, 1970, at 260: "Disruptive courtroom tactics are merely one symptom
of the widespread attack on the legitimacy of most of the institutions of this society as
now constituted."




methods unjust or unconstitutional, nor do they establish as a fact that
*the courts and the judicial process, as institutions, are unable to cope
with the situation.
The greatest significance of Allen will be its deterrent effect upon
those planning disruptive trials in the future. While this remains to be
seen, it is submitted that A len cannot help but be effective. To banish
the defendant who plans a disorderly trial deprives him of the oppor-
tunity to do that which he wants most to accomplish.
Bernadine Meyer
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